• India is strategically fortunate to have island territories in the Bay of Bengal as well as the Arabian Sea.
• The Andaman and Nicobar (A&N) group of 572 islands forms a springboard from where India can project power, exert influence, or strike friendships in its eastern neighbourhood.
• These islands could also be objects of desire for any country that wants to dominate the Bay of Bengal.

What is China’s island strategy in the South China Sea?

• Since 2013, China is building artificial islands in the South China Sea.
• China has created over 3,000-4,000 acres of new land atop reefs and rocks.
• Fiery Cross, Mischief and Subi Reefs have been provided with runways and harbours as well as guided-missile batteries.
• Objectives:
• By developing a capability to monitor all traffic that moves under or above the sea, termed “maritime domain awareness”, a nation can extend its defensive perimeter well beyond the homeland.
• By providing island outposts with surveillance facilities and fortifying them, a nation can project power over a huge oceanic expanse.

How India created Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC)?

• India placed all Armed Forces located in the A&N Islands in October 2001.
• All Armed Forces including the Coast Guard were placed under the newly created Commander-in-Chief, A&N (CINCAN) to be nominated, in rotation, from the three services.
• ANC’s functions: to ensure the defence of the territory, waters, airspace and the exclusive economic zone of the islands.
• The ANC was also charged with safeguarding the eastern approaches to the Indian Ocean and establishing an air defence identification zone (ADIZ) over the islands.

How neighbours reacted to ANC?

• South East Asian neighbours were already becoming wary of China.
• They expected that India would assert regional influence by positioning substantial forces with transnational capabilities in the A&N.
• After the establishment of ANC the Chinese Premier warned his countrymen about the “Malacca Dilemma”.

Why India kept the tri-service force levels low in A&N?

• India thought any overt show of force by India in the Bay of Bengal would be seen by neighbours as “muscle-flexing” and was, hence, undesirable.
• That is why despite frequent pleas by successive CINCANs, the tri-service force levels remained ridiculously small and inadequate for ocean surveillance or the establishment of an ADIZ.
• The services individually and collectively failed to lend support and reinforce the fledgling ANC.

Why ANC is an example of the Feasibility of Jointness?

• ANC served as a testing ground for implementing jointness in India''s military operations.
• The development of staff, logistics, and operational procedures in ANC served as a template for replication elsewhere.
• Overcoming initial hurdles and breaking down inter-service suspicion resulted in a highly efficient and functional joint command.
• The ANC''s successful humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts during the 2004 tsunami demonstrated its effectiveness.

What needs to be done for enhancing preparedness for crisis situations?

• The Kargil War 1999, the 2004 tsunami, and the Galwan Valley standoff 2020 serve as reminders of sudden crisis situations.
• The ANC needs urgent reinforcement to guard against future surprises.
• Necessary steps for fortification and augmentation include:
• Establishing comprehensive maritime domain awareness.
• Defending the archipelago from military intrusions.
• Tracking and intercepting hostile ships/submarines.
• Establishing a rapid reaction force for swift response through airlift or sealift.

How ANC can contribute to Indo-Pacific Security?

• The ANC can play a role in Indo-Pacific security due to China''s increasing aggression in the Himalayas and the Pacific.
• PLA Navy (PLAN) warships, submarines, and intelligence-gathering vessels have been frequent in the region.
• As the PLAN expands in numbers and capabilities, a permanent Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean could emerge.
• The ANC cannot match the PLAN "force-on-force" and must seek power-balancing alternatives.
• Existing partnerships like the Quad and Malabar, with the US, Japan, and Australia, can be utilized.
• The Quad leaders must address China''s belligerence and make tough decisions during the postponed summit.
• The Quad should enhance its stature and credibility by crafting an agenda and charter, even without forming a military alliance.

Strengthening the Quad/Malabar Construct

• India can inject dynamism into the Quad/Malabar construct by offering Port Blair in the Andamans as a location for a secretariat and meeting place for member navies.
• The Quad navies should progress from multinational "exercises" to multinational "operations" after achieving sufficient interoperability.
• Non-traditional threats provide opportunities for the Quad navies to engage in beneficial and practical operations.
• By increasing skills in disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, medical aid, submarine and aircraft rescue, and maritime security operations, the Quad can provide comfort and reassurance to smaller Indo-Pacific nations and deter potential hegemons.

The ANC must be adequately bolstered and retained as an independent joint command, to become India’s maritime bastion in the Bay of Bengal and to play a significant role in the ongoing Indo-Pacific “Great Game”.