Military Reform Beyond the CDS
The Limits of the CDS
India’s defence transformation is at a critical juncture. The creation of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) was a landmark step to foster jointness among the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Yet, the burden of reform cannot rest on one office alone. Theatreisation, capability development, and technological modernisation demand political ownership, assured financing, and institutionalised military advice. Without these, the CDS risks becoming a reform enabler without the authority to deliver change.
Political Ownership of Reform
The CDS provides integrated military counsel and pushes operational coordination, but lacks command authority over the services and control over finance, acquisitions, or industrial capacity. This limitation underscores the need for political leadership to treat military reform as a national decision, not an inter-service compromise. The design of theatre commands, allocation of air power, and balancing of continental and maritime priorities must be resolved at the highest level. Lessons from the Goldwater-Nichols reforms in the United States show that jointness succeeds only when political leaders drive it as a national imperative.
Financing Capability Development
Financial ownership is equally critical. India’s defence planning often remains aspirational because capability roadmaps are not backed by assured funding. Procurement delays in fighter aircraft, submarines, and tanks reflect the disconnect between long-term planning and annual budget cycles. Domestic industry cannot invest confidently in capacity or technology without predictable orders. Aligning defence budgets with operational requirements is a state responsibility, not a military one.
Institutionalised Military Advice
Institutionalised military advice must also be strengthened. Defence transformation cannot be crisis-driven; it requires structured dialogue between military leadership and political authority during peacetime. An apex mechanism for integrated military assessments would ensure that capability priorities and doctrinal choices are shaped by professional counsel rather than episodic interventions. Civilian control is reinforced, not weakened, when political leaders receive timely, honest, and integrated military advice.
Challenges in Defence Transformation
The challenges are formidable: inter-service differences, institutional resistance, fragmented levers of power, and slow reform momentum since the CDS’s creation in 2019. Reforms must not depend on the personality of one CDS but on durable institutions and clear political direction.
The Way Forward
Theatreisation must be treated as a political decision. Capability plans must be backed by assured funding. Institutional dialogue must be regular and structured. Jointness must be built from the ground up through training, logistics, and doctrine. Above all, defence transformation must be seen as a national endeavour requiring civil-military synergy.
Conclusion
India’s security environment demands integrated operations across multiple fronts, shaped by emerging technologies. The CDS can guide integration, but only political will, financial commitment, and institutionalised military advice can turn reform from aspiration into reality.