The idea and arrangement of asymmetrical power-sharing can be unsettling if not utilised properly. Such features in our Constitution are neither marginal nor merely provisional. These features touch upon a considerably large number of States. And without these features and provisions, it would not have been possible to undermine the secessionist tendencies of a highly diverse society.

Asymmetrical federalism will continue to have its relevance in the future because to pave the way for cooperative federalism we must be able to accommodate various groups and provide them with a share in the governance of the country at the same time.

Asymmetry is justified because

• Firstly, generally, the federations are seen as “indestructible units” of “indestructible states”; and neither of the constituent unit has power to make inroads into the defined territory of other. In India, this is different. Here, India is considered to be an indestructible union of destructible states.” Only the union is indestructible and the states are not. Towards this end, there is considerable domination of the union over states, and the later have no territorial integrity defined. The reorganization of the states is one of the easiest task parliament of India can do {by passing an ordinary law}. The bill for this purpose has to be placed in parliament on commendation of the President and after it has been referred to the relevant state legislature for ascertaining their views. Their approval is not necessary.
• Secondly, with a view to prevent the evil of predominant influence of larger units over smaller units in a federation, most federations in the world have resorted to some constitutional mechanism like equal representation of units or states in the Second Chamber and ratification of all amendments to the Constitution by states. We don’t find such provision of equal representation of states in the Rajya Sabha nor do the states have any substantial say over the amendments done to the Constitution from time to time. They are asked to ratify the laws only when their interest are involved.
• Thirdly, asymmetry is found among states also. For example, Article 371 makes special provisions for several states such as Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Goa, Mizoram, Manipur, Nagaland and Sikkim as per various accession or statehood deals.

Kinds of asymmetries found in Indian federation

• Firstly, there is a universal asymmetry affecting all units. For instance, States in India are represented by Rajya Sabha not on the basis of formal equality between states {as in United States} but has on the basis of their population. Due to this while UP has 31 seats in Rajya Sabha, States like Meghalaya, Mizoram, Manipur and Goa, and UTs like Pondicherry have just one seat each. Some UTs have no representation in Rajya Sabha. 
• Secondly, there are specific asymmetries with regard to the administration of tribal areas, intra-state regional disparities, law and order situation and fixation of number of seats in legislative assemblies in relation to states of Maharashtra, Gujarat, Assam, Manipur, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh, Goa under article 371. The Fifth and the Sixth Schedules of the Constitution comprise numerous distinctive provisions for administration and protection of Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes in any state (Fifth Schedule), and in the states of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, and Mizoram (Sixth Schedule). 
• Thirdly, the Union Territories also represent a kind of asymmetry. They were created on varied reasons. They were either too small to be full states or too diverse and difficult to merge into the nearby states. Comparably, the union territories are less autonomous than the states and are coordinated in varying degrees by the union government. Some union territories are entirely administrated by the union without any local representation. 
• Fourthly,  asymmetries  of sorts of de jure or constitutional asymmetries in terms of special position, powers, and protection enjoyed by the states of Nagaland (Article 371A of the Constitution), Sikkim (Article 371F), and Mizoram (Article 371G) as well as the former state of Jammu and Kashmir (Article 370 of the Constitution abrogated in August 2019) (Singh and Saxena 2013).  
• Finally, another significant asymmetry is the fiscal arrangements enshrined in the Constitution. When transferring funds from the Centre to States, statutory transfers are made based on the recommendations of the Finance Commission. The cost of implementing Centrally sponsored schemes to bring about welfare is co-shared by both the Centre and sub-national units. In the NITI Aayog era, the Centre has considerably reduced the share of its revenue to implement the Centrally sponsored schemes.

Historical reasons

• There are several historical reasons for this asymmetry and go back to British Era when they unified the country under their rule and later the way in which the territories under the direct control of the British and various principalities were integrated in the Indian Union.
• While the territories ruled directly by the British were easily integrated into the Union, the treaties of accession signed by individual rulers covered the integration of different principalities.
• The provinces ruled directly by the British had autonomy and rudimentary form of parliamentary government as the British loosened the grip gradually from 1919 onwards. The original constitution classified the states into four categories. The provinces directly ruled by the British were classified as Part `A’ states.
• The princely states which had a relationship with the Government of India based on individual treaties signed were classified as Part `B’ states. These included the states of Hyderabad, Mysore, Jammu and Kashmir and newly joined unions of princely states. In the case of Jammu and Kashmir, the powers special powers were given in the terms of accession.
• The remaining princely states acceding to the union were grouped under Part `C’ states.
• Finally, the territories ruled by other foreign powers gaining independence (French and Portuguese) and areas not covered in the above three categories were brought under the direct control of the union to form Part `D’ states or Union Territories. Thus, the Union of India in 1947 began with a major asymmetry between British India and the princely states and even among the latter, the terms of accession differed depending on the bargaining strength. In almost all cases, the princely states surrendered whatever notional sovereignty they had to the new country of India, in exchange for guaranteed privy purses.
• The nature of this bargain was clear – security and money in exchange for giving up authority or residual control rights. This is close to the standard view of federation as a political bargain, with the difference that the successors of the British in India, the Indian National Congress, were in an extremely strong bargaining position, even relative to the coalition of the princes. This was illustrated in the case of the exceptions to voluntary accession, such as Hyderabad, where military force (the authority over which was also inherited from the British) ensured integration into the new union.