EDITORIALS & ARTICLES

Sri Lanka economic crisis

  • Recently, Inflation in Sri-Lanka has soared past 17%. People are dying while waiting in queues for fuel, and authorities are scrapping school exams after running out of dollars to import paper and ink.

  • Sri Lanka is going through its worst economic crisis since its Independence.

    1. Driven out by hunger and loss of jobs, people from the island nation are seeking refuge in India, which is doing its best to help the neighbouring country.

    2. Despite continuous helping hands from India, the situation is not improving in Sri Lanka. The ripples of the economic crisis are now being felt in India too.

  • India has extended financial assistance to the tune of $2.4 billion in the last three months to Sri Lanka:

    1. A $400 million RBI currency swap

    2. Deferral of a $500 million loan

    3. A $1.5-billion credit line for importing fuel, food and medicines.

  • Besides the International Monetary Fund Bailout, the southern neighbour also has sought credit support of $2.5 billion from China.

  • The island has been facing severe power cuts and double-digit inflation, which hit double digits since the beginning of the year.

  • The Sri Lankan central bank allowed the local currency to devalue by 30% in a month to enhance exports.

  • The crisis has been mainly caused by a shortage of foreign exchange reserves. They have plummeted 70% in two years to just $2 billion at the end of February, which can barely cover two months of imports. Meanwhile, the country has foreign debt obligations of about $7 billion this year.

Reasons

  1. The forex crisis is the result of several factors:

    • Tourism, which is the country’s third-largest foreign exchange earner, came to a virtual halt after the 2019 Easter Sunday suicide bombings which killed more than 250 people. Tourist arrivals dropped by as much as 70%.

    • The Covid-19 pandemic brought a severe blow to the tourism industry. And remittances from foreign workers, which is the nation’s biggest source of dollars, slumped 22.7% to $5.5 billion in 2021.

    • The country’s heavy dependence on imports for essential goods like sugar, pharmaceuticals, fuel, pulses and cereals worsened the crisis.

  2. Sudden shift to ''Organic Farming'':

    • The government’s ban on chemical fertilizers last April as it looked to become the first country to fully adopt organic farming backfired.

    • A survey showed that 90% of Sri Lanka’s farmers used chemical fertilisers for cultivation.

    • The move led to a drastic drop in domestic food production, pushing up food prices.

    • The decision was rolled back after months of mass protests by farmers but the damage was done. Food inflation soared to 25.7% in February.

  3. Low Industrial production: Garment factories and tea estates could not function, as Covid-19 raged in clusters.Thousands of Sri Lankan labourers in West Asian countries were left stranded and returned jobless.

  4. Policy Failures of Government:

    • Food hoarding : The government declared emergency regulations for the distribution of essential food items. It put wide import restrictions to save dollars which in turn led to consequent market irregularities and reported hoarding.

    • Continuous borrowing : Fears of a sovereign default rose by the end of 2021, with the country’s foreign reserves plummeting to $1.6 billion, and deadlines for repaying external loans looming.

Impact of the Sri-Lankan crisis

  1. Transhipment nature of Sri-Lankan ports:

    • Thousands of containers sent from India to Sri Lanka, including for its own consumption as well as trans-shipment cargo, have been lying uncleared at Colombo port as authorities can’t economically afford to transfer containers between terminals.

    • India also relies considerably on Colombo port for global trade given it is a transhipment hub.

    • 60% of India’s trans-shipment cargo is handled by the port. India-linked cargo, in turn, accounts for 70% of the port’s total trans-shipment volume.

  2. Relations deterioration with India impacting Lankan Tourism and Investment:

    • India has traditionally been among Sri Lanka’s largest trade partners. Prior to the pandemic, India was the top tourism source for Sri Lanka.

    • More than one-fifth of Sri Lanka’s total imports come from India.

    • India is also one of the largest contributors to Foreign Direct Investment in Sri Lanka. FDI from India amounted to about $1.7 billion from 2005 to 2019.

    • The main investments from India are in the areas of petroleum retail, tourism and hotel, manufacturing, real estate, telecommunication, banking and financial services.

    • A number of leading companies from India have invested and established their presence in Sri Lanka. These include Indian Oil, Airtel, Taj Hotels, Dabur, Ashok Leyland, Tata Communications, Asian Paints, SBI and ICICI Bank.

  3. Sri-Lankan geopolitical location in Indian Ocean :

    • A predatory bond between Sri Lanka and China will threaten India''s interest in the Indian Ocean.

    • Sri-Lanka economic crisis can change into refugee crisis, if it leads to polarisation between different communities.

    • The Food scarcity, unemployment crisis and communal politics are breeding grounds for fundamentalism and extremism.

  4. India’s assistance being viewed in Sri Lanka very sceptically:

    • The leadership has thanked India for the timely assistance, but there is growing scepticism in Sri Lankan media and some sections, over Indian assistance “being tied” to New Delhi inking key infrastructure projects.

    • They mainly include the strategic Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm project, the National Thermal Power Corporation’s recent agreement with Ceylon Electricity Board to set up a solar power plant in Sampur, with investment from India’s Adani Group.

    • Lankan media accuses New Delhi of resorting to “diplomatic blackmail”. The political opposition has accused the Adani Group of entering Sri Lanka through the “back door”, avoiding competitive bids and due process.

Road ahead

  • Measures for Sri Lanka: The government should take measures for economic recovery of the country as soon as the shortage of certain essential commodities ends, which is expected before the start of the Sinhala-Tamil New Year (in mid-April).
    • The government should also join hands with the Tamil political leadership to create a roadmap for the economic development of the war-affected northern and eastern provinces, among the areas badly hit by the current crisis.
    • It would be best to raise domestic tax revenue and shrink government expenditure to limit borrowing, particularly sovereign borrowing from external sources.
      • Tough measures should be taken for restructuring the administration of concessions and subsidies.
  • India’s Assistance: It would be completely unwise for India to let the Chinese take over expanding chunks of Sri Lankan territory. India must offer Sri Lanka financial help, policy advice and investment from Indian entrepreneurs.
    • Indian businesses must build supply chains that intertwine the Indian and Sri Lankan economies in goods and services ranging from the export of tea to information technology services.
    • India, rather than any other nation, should help steer Sri Lanka towards realising its potential, to reap the rewards of a stable, friendly neighbourhood.

Sri Lanka requests IMF for rapid financial aid

The IMF’s main lending instruments are:

  • Stand-By Arrangement (SBA): Described by the IMF as its ‘workhorse’, the SBA is intended for emerging and advanced market economies to address short-term or potential balance of payments problems. It typically covers a period of 12-24 months, but no more than 36 months, and repayments are due within three-to-five years.

  • Standby Credit Facility (SCF): Similar in purpose to the SBA, this instrument is used to address short-term or potential balance of payments problems, but intended for low-income countries under the PRGT. SCF has a repayment grace period of four years and a final maturity of eight years.

  • Extended Fund Facility (EFF): The EFF is designed for emerging and advanced market economies with longer-term balance of payments problems, where impediments to growth are considered structural. EFFs are typically approved for three years but may be extended. Repayments are due within four-to-ten years.

  • Extended Credit Facility (ECF): The ECF is the equivalent to the EFF for low-income countries and falls under the PRGT. It is designed to address medium-to-long-term structural issues. ECFs are also provided initially for three years but may be extended up to five years and include a five-year grace period, with a maturity of ten years.

  • Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI): The RFI provides rapid financial assistance to countries with urgent balance of payments needs. RFIs can be used for a range of urgent needs, like natural disasters, conflicts and commodity price shocks, and should be repaid within three and a quarter to five years.

  • Rapid Credit Facility (RCF): The RCF, as is the case with the RFI, is designed for rapid financial assistance during crises, but serves low-income countries under the PRGT, and carries a grace period of five years and final maturity of ten years. Unlike other facilities, RCFs and RFIs are provided in one outright loan disbursement, meaning no conventional conditionality needs to be met during the programme prior to disbursements. However, as countries still have to provide a letter of intent to the IMF detailing their planned economic response to the crisis, to which the IMF must agree, RCF and RFI have nonetheless been considered to include de facto conditionality. In response to Covid-19, the IMF doubled how much countries can borrow under the RCF and RFI.

  • Flexible Credit Line (FCL): The FCL is designed for countries that the IMF deems to have strong policy frameworks and track records in economic performance that are in an immediate cash crunch – but want to avoid the stigma and adverse market reaction associated with regular IMF programmes with conditionality. The FCL therefore does not involve ongoing conditions and functions as a one-to-two year renewable credit line. Five countries have used the FCL so far (Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Poland). Repayment is required over a three-to-five-year period.

  • Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL): The PLL is designed to meet the liquidity needs of countries with economic frameworks that the IMF deems sound, but with remaining problems that preclude them from using the FCL. Only the Republic of North Macedonia and Morocco have used the PLL so far.

  • Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust (CCRT): The CCRT is different from the instruments above because it allows the IMF to provide grants, rather than loans, to the poorest countries in the form of debt relief. It was designed in 2015 during the Ebola outbreak to provide relief during catastrophic natural or public health disasters and free up resources to meet exceptional balance of payments needs. In 2020, its eligibility criteria were relaxed in response to Covid-19 and the instrument was initially approved for 25 eligible countries.

  • Policy Support Instrument (PSI): Finally, the IMF offers a facility to low income countries under the PRGT that involves no financing whatsoever. The PSI was designed to give low-income countries a ‘tool’ that enables them to secure IMF advice without financial assistance, with the intention of signalling confidence to donors, creditors and the general public that they are supported by the IMF. PSIs last between one and five years and cannot be used in conjunction with an ECF.

  • Preventing Illegal Refuge: The state of Tamil Nadu has already started feeling the impact of the crisis with the reported arrival of 16 persons from Sri Lanka through illegal means.
    • Tamil Nadu was home to nearly three lakh refugees after the anti-Tamil pogrom of 1983.
    • The authorities, both in India and Sri Lanka, should ensure that the present crisis is not used to step up smuggling activities and trafficking or whip up emotions in both countries.
  • Crisis as an Opportunity: Neither Sri Lanka nor India can afford to have strained ties. As a much larger country, the onus is on India, it needs to be extremely patient and engage Sri Lanka even more regularly and closely.
    • There is also a need to step up our people-centric developmental activities while scrupulously staying clear of any interference in Colombo’s domestic affairs.
    • The crisis should be used as an opportunity for New Delhi and Colombo to thrash out a solution to the Palk Bay fisheries dispute - a longstanding irritant in bilateral ties.






POSTED ON 14-05-2022 BY ADMIN
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