Discuss the utility of Nuclear Deterrence Theory in the context of the recent standoff between India and Pakistan. (UPSC CSE Mains 2019 - Political Science and International Relations, Paper 2).
- In general, nuclear weapons are much harder to be contested by enemy actions. The reason for that is that even a small fraction of the nuclear weapons that would survive in the aftermath of a preemptive strike would be more than enough to incur impossible costs. This was especially true during the early Cold War as there was little in the way of defending against a nuclear attack, but even now when the anti-missile systems are much more advanced, the risk of (even fairly limited) second strike possibility is not to be taken lightly. At its core, nuclear deterrence is based on mutually assured destruction that would come to be in case of full war.
- Am example of nuclear deterrence in practice is the Kargil Crisis of 1999, had likewise revolved around Kashmir, this time around the strategic area of Kargil. This area is well beyond the Line of Control and its capture by Pakistan soldiers threatened crucial supply lines and communication. Unlike the previous crisis where the nuclear capabilities of both nations were kind of ambiguous, the nuclear tests performed by both countries during the 1990s meant that both nations were aware of the credibility of each other’s arsenals. As such, India was well aware of the risk that would come with a hostile incursion into Pakistani territory. Strict orders were given not to cross Indo-Pakistan borders, even though there were Indian plans that would result in an invasion of Pakistan.
- The first country to demonstrate its nuclear capabilities was India, which managed to conduct its first nuclear test (Operation Smiling Budha) in 1974 even though the country was initially opposed to the development of nuclear weapons based on Gandhian ideals of non-violence. Due to continuous disputes with Pakistan and China, India simply needed to develop an effective deterrence strategy to defend itself from its regional rivals, Pakistan and India. As of today, India dedicates approximately 150 nuclear warheads to this cause.
- As for its doctrine, India adopts a firm no-first-use policy of nuclear weapons. Though such a policy is quite common and respectable, it brings its own set of issues for deterrence. Since deterrence is in many ways a game of brinkmanship, the lack of resolve to confidently employ nuclear weapons could make the country look less resolute. Furthermore, the no-first-use policy also means that nuclear weapons will not be used in the case of conventional attack and by itself offers only limited deterrence against non-nuclear threats.
- Despite the certain disadvantages of having a nuclear arsenal solely for the purpose of retaliation, there are practical reasons for why India adopted such a doctrine. As a late nuclear power, it is not one of the signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which severely limits its access to the market with nuclear material/technologies. However, the Indian need for nuclear deterrence also means that it cannot give up its nuclear weapons. Because of it, India has to show a more responsible approach to its nuclear program and tread carefully in order to not attract unwanted attention from the international community that might result in worsening of relations or economic sanctions.
- Pakistan, on the other hand, is perceived to be the nominally weaker party (proved by the secession of Bangladesh), and as such, it needed to develop a nuclear arsenal to defend against its eastern neighbor in an almost existential struggle. Furthermore, the fact that India managed to test nuclear weapons first then gave Pakistan further incentives to advance its own program. Lagging, the country’s nuclear program became operable most likely in the late 1990s as it was not able to convince India of its nuclear capabilities in the 1990 crisis, but played an important role in the Kargil crisis.
- Due to its position as an “underdog”, Pakistan also did not adopt the no-first-use policy as it needs its nuclear arsenal not only to deter Indian nuclear weapons but also its conventional forces.
- Like in the cold war, India and Pakistan may try to use the risk of escalation to get the upper hand. Hence, nuclear weapons can also make such instances dangerous instead of reducing wars. The deterrence theory is also unable to deal with the non-state armed groups which are a significant element of Indo-Pak relations.
- The nuclear deterrence theory is highly unstable. The likelihood of a deterrence failure and nuclear catastrophe in India and Pakistan is not high, but it remains significant and alternatives should be searched.
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