A nuclear doctrine states how a nuclear weapon state would employ its nuclear weapons both during peace and war. India conducted a series of nuclear tests in May 1998, demonstrating its capacity to use nuclear energy for military purposes.

• Pakistan soon followed, thereby increasing the vulnerability of the region to a nuclear exchange.
• The international community was extremely critical of the nuclear tests in the subcontinent and sanctions were imposed on both India and Pakistan, which were subsequently waived.
• After the 1998 nuclear test India also enunciated a doctrine of ''No First Use’ (NFU) of nuclear weapons.
• The doctrine was formally adopted in January, 2003, and says that nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere.
• Since the adoption of nuclear doctrine, India has said consistently that its nuclear weapons were based on staggering and punitive retaliation, in case the deterrence has failed.
• Pakistan, by contrast, has openly threatened India with the use of nuclear weapons on multiple occasions beginning from the time the two nations were not even acknowledged nuclear powers.

Advantages of NFU

• The NFU policy facilitates restrained nuclear weapons programmewithout tactical weapons and a complicated command and control system.
• The doctrine minimises the probability of nuclear useby avoiding the deployment of weapons on hair-trigger alert and keeping an arms-race in check.
• The doctrine also reduces the chances of unnecessary chaosas the onus of taking the decision to escalate a nuclear use lies on the adversary.
• Strict adherence to the doctrine can strengthen India’s efforts to gain membership in Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) and United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

Arguments Against NFU

• The idea of no-first-use (NFU) of nuclear weapons has been rejected by some nuclear weapons states and accepted only at the declaratory level by most, if not by all of the others.
• Nuclear weapons are often seen as an antidote to conventional inferiority as the inferiorparty will seek to deter conventional attack by threatening a nuclear response.
• The first-use nuclear doctrine introduces an element of nuclear risk to any war contemplated by the superior state as it is hard for the potential attacker to confidently calculate that it can achieve victory at an acceptable cost when there is a possibility of nuclear escalation.
• In India the NFU policy has been called into question on the grounds that it allows Pakistan to take the initiative while restricting India’s options militarily and puts India in a disadvantageous position.
• Pakistan’s low nuclear thresholds and its policy of using its nuclear umbrella to foment sub-conventional conflict in Indiais the principal reason behind the debate around India’s ‘no first use’ policy.

Implications of Abandoning NFU for India

• Withdrawing the NFU policy and making a declaration to that effect can affect India’s status as a responsible nuclear power.
• Such a step will abrogate India’s commitment to the universal goal of nuclear disarmamentand upset the regional balance in the sub-continent.
• Further, abrogating the doctrine would signal a first use posture by India, thus reducing the space for conventional warfare below the nuclear threshold. This could also severely corrode India’s ability to limit Pakistan’s offensive tactics and policies at the conventional level.
• Moreover, China’s expansionist policies cannot be deterred by revising the doctrine, the decision to abandon the doctrine can send a deliberate signal of provocation to China.
• Nuclear preemption is a costly policyas it requires massive investment not only in weapons and delivery systems but also intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) infrastructure.
• India would require a far bigger inventoryof nuclear weapons particularly as eliminating adversaries’ nuclear capabilities would require targeting of its nuclear assets involving multiple warheads.
• India is yet to induct the Multiple Reentry Vehicle (MRV) technologyin its missiles, which is fundamental to eliminating hardened nuclear targets.
• First use doctrine will also require to devolves control of nuclear weapons from the scientific enclave to the military for their eventual use.
• Moreover, the after effects of the nuclear fallout, depending on the magnitude of nuclear explosions, could pose existential threats to humanity itself.

Road ahead

• As security is a dynamic concept and all doctrines needs periodic reviews. Same is the case with India.
• If Indian policymakers feel a need to review the nation’s nuclear doctrine,they should be cognizant of the costs involved in doing so.
• A sound policy debate can only ensue if the costs and benefits of a purported policy shift are discussed and debated widely.
• Also, India must gradually revise its posture of ‘active deterrence’ to ‘dissuasive deterrence’by building up its infrastructure along the border and improving the surveillance and warning capabilities among other things.
• Like India, China too has an NFU policy so it provides an opportunity to work jointly towards a global no first use nuclear order.