Introduction

A recent judgment by the Chhattisgarh High Court in a custodial death case has raised serious concerns about the Indian judiciary’s stance on police brutality and systemic caste-based violence. The facts of the case are deeply disturbing: a Dalit man died in police custody, with an initial medical report showing no injuries, only for a post-mortem to later reveal 26 wounds. Yet, even more troubling is the High Court’s rationale in downgrading the conviction from murder to culpable homicide, on the grounds that the police officers had merely intended to “teach him a lesson.” This seemingly innocuous phrase carries profound legal and constitutional implications, as it subtly legitimises violence by state actors and weakens the very principles of justice the Constitution upholds.

The Dangerous Normalisation of State Violence

·       The phrase “teaching a lesson” may appear as a casual description of intent, but in legal discourse, it functions as a dangerous normalisation of custodial brutality. It reframes acts of violence by state officials not as criminal transgressions but as excessive discipline—improper, perhaps, but not entirely illegitimate. This framing flies in the face of constitutional principles that define the state as a lawful entity bound by due process, proportionality, and respect for rights. India’s legal order does not grant law enforcement officers the authority to inflict punishment outside the judicial process.

·       When a constitutional court uses language that casts custodial violence as a misguided but understandable attempt at discipline, it undermines the rule of law. Judicial reasoning influences both public perception and institutional behaviour. The implication that such violence is merely an overzealous form of correction sends a troubling message to police officers across the country: that brutality may not only be tolerated but tacitly condoned under certain circumstances.

Caste and the Systemic Erasure of Structural Violence

·       Equally disconcerting is the judicial erasure of caste from the case’s narrative. The victim, a Dalit man, was reportedly assaulted by upper-caste police officers, yet neither the trial court nor the High Court found it appropriate to invoke the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. Their justification rested on the absence of explicit caste-based slurs or overt discriminatory intent.

·       This interpretation is both legally narrow and socially blind. It ignores how caste-based violence operates through implicit power hierarchies and structural inequalities, especially in rural policing contexts where Dalits and Adivasis are disproportionately subjected to abuse. By setting the evidentiary bar unrealistically high—demanding explicit proof of caste motivation—the judiciary effectively empties the SC/ST Act of its purpose and fails the very communities it was designed to protect. This narrow reading divorces violence from the context in which it occurs and reduces structural oppression to isolated, provable instances of prejudice.

Judicial Apathy and the Failure of Safeguards

·       The failure to address custodial violence is not a recent development, nor is it limited to a single case. The Supreme Court of India, in landmark cases such as D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, has repeatedly laid out guidelines to prevent torture and abuse in custody. These include mandates for proper arrest procedures, medical examination of detainees, and independent oversight. However, compliance remains inconsistent and largely superficial. The mechanisms meant to ensure accountability—such as departmental inquiries and internal investigations—often remain in the hands of the very institutions implicated in the abuse, leading to a vicious cycle of impunity.

·       Within this context, the Chhattisgarh High Court’s reasoning is especially regressive. Instead of confronting a pattern of institutional failure, the court effectively legitimises it by portraying custodial violence as a regrettable but well-intentioned act. This narrative only serves to reinforce the already weak enforcement of constitutional safeguards, and makes future violations more likely by providing legal cover to perpetrators.

Judicial Integrity and the Rejection of Coercive Narratives

·       For the judiciary to fulfil its role as a guardian of constitutional democracy, it must categorically reject any attempt to morally justify or mitigate state-inflicted violence. Police officers are not vigilantes entrusted with correcting behaviour through coercion; they are public servants who must operate within the boundaries of law. Endorsing the notion of “teaching a lesson” substitutes the rule of law with fear and replaces due process with arbitrary punishment.

·       True deterrence comes not from hidden injuries inflicted behind closed doors, but from transparent, proportionate, and lawful punishment administered through an impartial judicial system. Courts must assert that custodial violence is not merely unlawful but antithetical to the democratic ethos. This includes an expansive reading of the SC/ST Act, one that recognises how caste functions as a structural axis of vulnerability and does not require overt proof of prejudice to activate legal protections.

·       Moreover, investigations into custodial deaths must be taken out of the hands of the implicated institutions. Independent and empowered oversight bodies are essential for ensuring accountability. Most crucially, judicial discourse must model an unwavering commitment to upholding human dignity, signalling zero tolerance for brutality masquerading as discipline.

Conclusion

·       India’s Constitution is anchored in the ideals of dignity, equality, and rule of law—principles fundamentally incompatible with a justice system that rationalises custodial violence. The High Court’s use of the phrase “teaching a lesson” not only weakens the moral authority of the judiciary but also risks undoing decades of constitutional jurisprudence aimed at curbing police excess and protecting marginalised communities. What is needed now is not symbolic outrage but a structural overhaul—firm enforcement of legal safeguards, strong implementation of protective laws like the SC/ST Act, independent investigative mechanisms, and a judicial language that affirms the absolute sanctity of individual rights.

·       To tolerate anything less is to edge toward authoritarianism, where power is unchecked, and justice is dispensed not through rights, but through bruises. Justice must be defined not by retribution or coercion, but by fairness, proportionality, and unyielding respect for human dignity.