Government''s True Intention

• The formation of the High-Level Committee on Simultaneous Elections by the government had a predetermined agenda.
• The first Term of Reference (ToR) directed the Committee to "examine and make recommendations for holding simultaneous elections." This implies that the Committee’s mandate was to explore how simultaneous elections could be held for both the Lok Sabha and the 28 state legislative assemblies.
• The Committee was not empowered to suggest that simultaneous elections might be undesirable or impractical for India’s democratic structure.
• Thus, the true intent of the government was to gather support for the concept rather than to explore its feasibility objectively.

 Composition of the Committee

The composition of the Committee revealed a significant bias. Out of the nine members, only one was a constitutional expert, and another had expertise in parliamentary procedures without having practiced or taught law. The remaining members included two politicians and three bureaucrats-turned-politicians. The Chairman, Ram Nath Kovind, was appointed more as an adornment to lend the Committee gravitas but was not himself a scholar of constitutional law. This lack of constitutional expertise raised concerns that the study was not grounded in sound legal and democratic principles. The Committee was not constituted as a body of constitutional scholars capable of evaluating such a critical issue objectively.

Absence of Global Precedents

The idea of simultaneous elections is not found in any large federal democratic nation. For example:

United States: Elections to the House of Representatives are held every two years, the Presidential election every four years, and Senate elections occur every six years in a staggered manner.

Germany: Some states (like Thuringia and Saxony) hold elections according to their own election cycles, separate from elections to the Bundestag (national parliament).

These countries respect the federal structure, allowing each level of government to have its own electoral cycle. India, with its complex and diverse democracy, has no historical precedent or global model that aligns with simultaneous elections.

Contradiction with Federal and Parliamentary Democracy

• The Committee’s recommendation for simultaneous elections contradicts the very essence of India’s federal and parliamentary democracy.
• In a parliamentary system, the government is accountable to the legislature and, by extension, to the people on a daily basis. Unlike a presidential system, there is no fixed term for the executive, which can fall due to loss of confidence.
• India''s Constitution-makers debated this issue during the drafting process and rejected the Presidential system in favor of a parliamentary model, as they believed it was more suitable for India''s diversity and complex political structure.

Constitutional Amendments Required

• To implement simultaneous elections, multiple constitutional amendments would be necessary.
• New articles such as 82A, 83(3), 172(3), and amendments to Articles 327 and others would be required. These changes would synchronize the terms of state legislative assemblies with the Lok Sabha’s five-year cycle.
• However, this synchronization would mean that several state assemblies, elected between 2025 and 2028, would have their terms cut short by 1 to 4 years in the lead-up to a simultaneous election in 2029.
• For example, if a state assembly is elected in 2027, it would serve only two years, and an assembly elected in 2028 would serve just one year. This situation could lead to political instability and dissatisfaction among voters and political parties.

 Political Manipulation Risks

• Simultaneous elections could also open doors for political manipulation.
• In situations where a government falls mid-term, or there is a hung assembly, fresh elections would have to be held for the remainder of the term, which could be as short as a few months. Such truncated elections would be farcical and would primarily benefit well-funded political parties.
• Furthermore, chief ministers could use the threat of mid-term elections to control dissatisfied party members, maintaining internal stability through coercion.

Historical Perspective on Election Stability

• India has seen electoral stability over the past two decades. While there was instability between 1981 and 2000, the period since 1999 has been characterized by most state governments and the Lok Sabha completing their full five-year terms.
• The staggered election system has not hindered India’s economic growth.
• For example, the UPA government achieved an average growth rate of 7.5% during its 10-year tenure, and the current NDA government claims to have performed even better. Hence, the claim that staggered elections impede governance and growth is not supported by historical evidence.

 Conclusion: One Nation, One Election is Flawed

The article concludes that the One Nation, One Election proposal is impractical, unnecessary, and fundamentally opposed to India''s federal and parliamentary democratic system. The proposed amendments would create instability, allow political manipulation, and diminish the voice of diverse states in the Indian union. It is unlikely that the proposal will gain sufficient support in Parliament, and the author expresses hope that it will be rejected.