In February 2022, West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee blocked Governor Jagdeep Dhankhar on Twitter. She said she was “forced” to do so because of his “unethical and unconstitutional” statements and accused him of treating government officials like “his servants”. Dhankhar responded with a series of tweets on the “essence and spirit of democracy” and saying the CM’s move was “against constitutional norms”. Days earlier, the Tamil Nadu government had taken exception to Governor R N Ravi’s Republic Day speech articulating the benefits of NEET, the medical entrance exam. Tamil Nadu has passed a Bill to exempt the state from NEET; Ravi has sent it back to the state.

These are two of many examples of bitterness between states and Governors.

What is the law on Governor-state relations?
Although envisaged as an apolitical head who must act on the advice of the council of ministers, the Governor enjoys certain powers granted under the Constitution, such as giving or withholding assent to a Bill passed by the state legislature, or determining the time needed for a party to prove its majority, or which party must be called first do so, generally after a hung verdict in an election.
There are, however, no provisions laid down for the manner in which the Governor and the state must engage publicly when there is a difference of opinion. The management of differences has traditionally been guided by respect for each other’s boundaries.
What have been the friction points?
In recent years, these have been largely about the selection of the party to form a government, deadline for proving majority, sitting on Bills, and passing negative remarks on the state administration.
In November 2018, then J&K Governor Satyapal Malik dissolved the Assembly amid indications that various parties were coming together to form the government. This paved the way for the Centre to later bifurcate state into two Union territories, by considering the Governor as the government.
In November 2019, after a hung verdict in Maharashtra, Governor Bhagat Singh Koshiyari quietly invited BJP leader Devendra Fadnavis and administered him oath as CM. This government lasted just 80 hours. Six months later, Koshiyari refused to nominate CM Uddhav Thackeray to the Legislative Council, leading Thackeray to meet PM Narendra Modi to resolve the issue.
In West Bengal, Dhankhar has often commented on law and order and political violence. Ravi, in his previous stint as Nagaland Governor, had criticised affairs of the state and allegedly interfered in administration. In December 2020, Kerala Governor Arif Mohammed Khan turned down a request to summon a special sitting of the Assembly to debate the three central farm laws.
Following the Karnataka polls in 2018, Governor Vajubhai Vala invited the BJP to form the government and gave B S Yeddyurappa 15 days to prove majority. Challenged by Congress and JDS in the Supreme Court, it was reduced to three days.
Is such friction recent?
Allegations of the Centre using the Governor’s position to destabilise state governments have been made since the 1950s. In 1959, Kerala’s E M S Namboodiripad government was dismissed based on a report by the Governor. Several state governments have been dismissed since then, including 63 through President’s Rule orders issued by Governors between 1971 and 1990. These have include the Birender Singh government in Haryana (1967); Virendra Patil government in Karnataka (1971); M Karunanidhi government in Tamil Nadu (1976); B S Shekhawat government in Rajasthan and SAD government in Punjab (1980); Janata Party governments in UP, Odisha, Gujarat and Bihar (1980); N T Rama Rao government in Andhra in (1984); and Kalyan Singh governments in UP (1992, 1998). These became less frequent during the coalition era at the Centre and the emergence of strong regional parties.
Why does this happen?
“Because Governors have become political appointees,” said NALSAR chancellor and constitutional expert Faizan Mustafa. “The Constituent Assembly envisaged governor to be apolitical. But politicians become Governors and then resign to fight elections.”
Constitutional expert Alok Prasanna of Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy said: “The CM is answerable to the people. But the Governor is answerable to no one except the Centre. You can sugercoat it with ideas of constitutional morality and values, but the truth is there is a fundamental defect in the Constitution.”
There is no provision for impeaching the Governor, who is appointed by the President on the Centre’s advice. While the Governor has 5-year a tenure, he can remain in office only until the pleasure of the President.
In 2001, the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, headed by retired CJI M N Venkachaliah and set up by the Atal Behari Vajpayee, said, “… because the Governor owes his appointment and his continuation in the office to the Union Council of Ministers, in matters where the Central Government and the State Government do not see eye to eye, there is the apprehension that he is likely to act in accordance with the instructions, if any, received from the Union Council of Ministers… Indeed, the Governors today are being pejoratively called the ‘agents of the Centre’.”
In the Constitution, there are no guidelines for exercise of the Governor’s powers, including for appointing a CM or dissolving the Assembly. There is no limit set for how long a Governor can withhold assent to a Bill.
What reforms have been suggested?
The Sarkaria Commission, set up in 1983 to examine Centre-state relations, pithily defined federalism as being ''more of a functional arrangement for cooperative activity than a static institutional concept''. And it is the smooth functional aspect of governorships that has come into question down the decades, the latest involving Kerala governor Arif Mohammed Khan and the Kerala government. The state government has recommended that Sarkaria''s successor, the M M Punchhi Commission that submitted its report in 2010, consider that Article 156 of the Constitution be amended to give the state government a say in the matter of a governor''s recall. This is not a new request. Even as earlier commissions, including the M N Venkatachaliah-headed National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution set up in 2001 by the Atal Bihari Vajpayee government, dealt more with finding ways of appointing governors so as to avoid them being perceived as ''agents of the Centre''.
The Punchhi Commission suggests gubernatorial appointments be made by a committee comprising the prime minister, home minister, Lok Sabha speaker and the chief minister of the state, and that a governor can be removed only via a resolution by the state legislature. This leaves the matter of central disapproval vs state approval of recalling governors in a grey area. Historically, points of contention between Centre and states have been over governors'' powers of inviting a party to form a government, dissolving an assembly, etc. Of late, cause of friction has come to include governors allegedly commenting on ''political matters''.

Whatever the points of Centre-state chafing may be, smoother functioning and ''cooperative activity'' are needed. The Constituent Assembly intended governors to be apolitical. That horse may have bolted. But having a counterbalancing force in place - the state having a say in both appointment and removal of governors along with the Centre - is an idea that could serve an apolitical, larger, symbiotic purpose for a healthier federal India.