The EU's Indo-Pacific Strategy

Recently, the Council of the European Union (EU) approved the long-awaited “EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific Council Conclusions”. Need for European Union’s Indo-Pacific Strategy
  • EU is not a traditional security actor in the Indo-Pacific: The region is home to five of EU’s top 10 trading partners, and the sea lanes of this region ship a large volume of the EU’s international trade.
  • Existence of EU companies in Indo-Pacific region: The European nationals have a sizeable presence and EU companies have made impressive footholds in this region.
  • Anti-China stance in global trade: The embryo of the Indo-Pacific strategy of many regional and global actors might have developed out of an implicit anti-China stance, but the EU prefers a balancing act.
    • The EU considers China a partner, competitor and rival.
    • In recent years, China’s aggressive foreign policy and military adventures in its neighbourhood and human rights violations in Xinjiang have created a negative perception against China in the EU.
  • EU following objectives of Quad Group: The strategy has followed the Quad line while calling for free, open, and secure maritime routes, a rules-based international order, upholding democratic values, and ASEAN’s centrality in the regional architecture.
    • India can become an important pillar of the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy: India has offered continuity and sophistication over the years to European Union.
    • In the post-Brexit scenario, the forthcoming India-EU Summit will provide a platform for the consolidation of strategic partnership and provide an opportunity to enhance policy convergence on Indo-Pacific.
  • Indo-Pacific region represents the world’s economic and strategic centre of gravity: It is home to 60% of the world’s population producing 60% of global GDP, contributing two thirds of current global growth.
Features of European Union’s Indo-Pacific Strategy
  • EU reinventing its image as a maritime security actor: The EU is set to commit to a “meaningful” naval presence and cooperation with partner navies to comprehensively monitor maritime security and freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific.
  • Working with partners: The promotion of cooperation stands at the core of the EU’s approach to the Indo-Pacific.
    • It applies not only to Europe’s long-standing friends and allies that share its values, but also to cooperation with “third countries for mutual benefit.
    • It is aimed at cooperation within regional multilateral organizations, such as ASEAN-centered mechanisms or those within the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) process.
  • No pointing fingers: In the tradition of most EU strategies, the document avoids naming and shaming.
    • Instead of explicitly mentioning the usual suspects and culprits, it points out challenges for regional stability in the form of geopolitical competition.
  • Strong on soft issues: The need to address global issues such as climate change, biodiversity loss, and the socioeconomic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic is among the top priorities for Europe and part of its highest added value for the region.
  • High quality and sustainable connectivity: The 2018 “Strategy for Connecting Europe and Asia” outlined the EU’s principles for a sustainable, transparent, and rules-based connectivity.
Significance of European Union’s Indo-Pacific strategy
  • Regional Stability: It reflects the reconfiguration of the EU’s Asia-Pacific approach to the Indo-Pacific, given the changing geopolitical situation.
  • Acknowledged intense geopolitical competition: The EU’s strategy document has avoided naming and shaming anybody while acknowledging intense geopolitical competition adding to increasing tensions on trade and supply chains as well as technological, political and security areas.
  • Balancing and inclusive approach towards China: The EU has called for a Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) with China, indicating that engaging Beijing is not necessarily an antithesis to its Indo-Pacific strategy.
  • Regional security and prosperity: The EU’s strategy calls for developing partnerships in security and defence.
    • Its broad security agenda includes threats from malicious cyber activities, disinformation, emerging technologies, terrorism, organised crime, disaster prevention and recovery, piracy, trafficking, and economic and human effects of the pandemic.
  • EU can be a valuable partner in the Indo-Pacific region: The EU-Asia Connectivity strategy, considered the EU’s answer to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), can moderate China’s dominance while providing a sustainable alternative.
    • The EU has concluded trade agreements with Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Vietnam and some Pacific countries.
Road ahead
  • The EU’s strategy needs to be seen in the larger context of EU’s global power aspirations and the region’s changing dynamics due to China’s revisionist challenge to the rules-based international order.
  • The EU can increase its visibility as a security actor in the region by responding to the geo-strategic “burden sharing” with other like-minded regional and global actors.
  • The greater involvement of the EU and convergence of actions with other actors will strengthen and give further legitimacy to the call for a rules-based international order in the region.
  • The strategy allows the EU to enhance cooperation further in many areas such as ocean governance, health, research and technology, security and defence, connectivity and strengthen working together on tackling global challenges.
  • The strategy is deliberately pragmatic, flexible and multi-faceted, allowing the EU to adapt and build its cooperation according to specific policy areas where partners can find common ground.


POSTED ON 06-05-2021 BY ADMIN
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