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In 1998, India declared itself as a nuclear weapon state. India refuses to sign NPT and CTBT. What would be the implications for india’s nuclear policy in case it signs both the treaties?. (UPSC CSE Mains 2015- Political Science and International Relations, Paper 2)
There are several valid reasons for signing the treaty – some based on the benefits that would accrue if we announced such a decision, others by showing that the “option” of testing forgone is not very important.
Diplomatic gains
- It would enhance our stature further. The fact that India would be doing so without requiring prior ratification by China and the US, would establish our ability to take independent initiatives that are good for the country and the world.
- At a more pragmatic level, the move will greatly strengthen our case for being admitted to the NSG and other international groupings.
Forgoing future testing
- Legally speaking, as a sovereign nation, we can certainly resume testing again. Realistically, however, we can’t really exercise that option without seriously damaging our credibility in the international community. Abandoning our voluntary moratorium on testing would nullify all the effort we have made during the last two decades to shed the unfair tag of being a pariah state and to be viewed as a responsible nuclear nation.
A unilateral decision
- India has a nuclear doctrine which clearly eschews nuclear aggression and seeks to build only a credible minimum deterrent. Unlike the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War, India does not entertain notions of conducting a nuclear war and winning it.
- Traditional wisdom pertaining to conventional weapons – the bigger the better – does not apply to nuclear weapons for minimal deterrence. As we have repeatedly argued for years, just a pair of 20 kT fission bombs dropped on a pair of major cities of the adversary would kill half a million people. That represents sufficient unacceptable damage for any modern state, the prospect of which is enough to deter any thoughts of an attack by them. For such counter-value attacks, 50 kT thermonuclear weapons are not needed. The arsenal of fission weapons we already possess is more than sufficient, with plenty of redundancy.
- Lastly, let us put to rest the standard objection that in signing the CTBT, we would be – or be seen as – succumbing to US pressure. It is true that the Americans have time and again urged us to join the CTBT despite themselves stopping short of ratifying it. But these periodic suggestions do not add up to any significant pressure, unlike the pressure mounted on us when the Narasimha Rao government was planning the nuclear test.
- Today, there are no penalties or threats of sanctions for our not signing the CTBT. Besides, to not take a step that is good for us simply because others have suggested it for their own reasons is as much allowing ourselves to be dictated by them as taking the step.
- Additionally, Pakistan’s suggestion that we enter into a bilateral agreement with them to not test does not merit a serious consideration. To test or not is not a bilateral matter. If we join the CTBT, it would be a unilateral step. Therefore, no serious commentator aware of the situation can attribute our joining the CTBT at this juncture to any external pressure.
- A nation aspiring to be a world power must not shy away from taking bold initiatives at crucial periods. As Shakespeare wrote, “There is a tide in the affairs of men which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune.” Such an opportunity is available to India to fortify its place as a leader in the community of nations, that too without flexing its military or economic muscle.