• India is close to achieving a Naxal-free Bharat, with Left-Wing Extremism (LWE) districts reduced from 126 (2014) to 11 (2025) and only 3 most-affected districts remaining.

Reducing the Red Corridor

Trends in Naxalism in India (2014–2025):

• Sharp territorial contraction: Maoist influence shrank from 126 to 11 districts, with core Red Corridor areas dismantled. Eg: Most-affected districts reduced from 36 to 3 by 2025.
• Steep fall in violence and casualties: Sustained decline in incidents and deaths. Eg: Violent incidents down 53%, civilian deaths down 70%, and security force deaths down 73% compared to 2004–14.

• High cadre attrition: Arrests, surrenders and neutralisation peaked. Eg: 2025 alone saw 317 neutralised, 800+ arrested, ~2,000 surrendered.

• Collapse of Maoist parallel governance: Roads, telecom and policing broke jungle sanctuaries.

History of Naxalism in India

• Origin (1967): The Naxalbari uprising in West Bengal emerged from landlessness and exploitative agrarian relations, turning class conflict into armed mobilisation. Eg: Charu Mazumdar’s line popularised “land to the tiller” through Maoist-inspired revolutionary politics.
• Expansion (1980s–2000s): The movement spread into tribal Fifth Schedule belts where weak administration, land alienation and forest control created deep state-society distrust. Eg: The 2004 formation of CPI (Maoist) unified factions and intensified LWE across central India.
• Peak and decline (2005–2014): Maoists built “liberated zones” and parallel systems, but coordinated state action gradually increased pressure through policing and development. Eg: The Red Corridor expanded from AP to Jharkhand, yet large operations began shrinking safe havens.
• Decisive rollback (2014 onwards): A unified security-development approach with permanent camps, roads and telecom broke Maoist mobility and recruitment networks in core areas. Eg: Strongholds like Bastar and Dandakaranya saw sustained clearance and governance footprint expansion.

Initiatives taken to counter Naxalism

1. Constitutional & governance measures:-

• Fifth Schedule framework: It provides special governance for Scheduled Areas via Governor powers and Tribal Advisory Councils, aiming to prevent exploitation and land alienation.
• PESA Act, 1996: It empowers Gram Sabhas to control local resources and consent processes, intended to deepen self-rule and reduce outsider domination.
• Forest Rights Act, 2006: FRA recognises individual and community forest rights, correcting historical injustice and strengthening livelihood security for forest dwellers.

2. Development & welfare schemes:-

• Infrastructure saturation: Roads, electricity and telecom reduce isolation, expand service delivery, and allow faster security response in remote interiors.
• Financial inclusion: Banking access cuts cash dependence, enables DBT delivery, and reduces extortion and shadow-economy influence in affected blocks.
• Skill and education push: Training and local employability reduce the recruitment pool by giving youth credible alternatives to insurgent networks.

3. Security & enforcement:-

• Fortified policing: Permanent forward presence prevents Maoist re-occupation, improves area domination, and protects development works from disruption.
• Financial choking: Seizures and attachments disrupt extortion channels, arms procurement and urban networks that sustain the insurgency ecosystem.
• Surrender-cum-rehabilitation policy: Incentives, security guarantees and livelihoods convert cadres into stakeholders of peace and weaken local Maoist manpower.

Challenges to complete eradication:-

• Governance deficits persist: Courts, policing, health and schools remain thin in interiors, making the state visible mainly through coercion, not services. Eg: Low tribal representation in permanent bureaucracy sustains “outsider rule” perceptions.
• Weak implementation of rights laws: If FRA/PESA protections look negotiable, new displacement and distrust can re-create conditions for mobilisation. Eg: Gram Sabha consent bypass in mining belts becomes a recurring grievance trigger.
• Socio-economic vulnerability: Poverty, land disputes and insecure livelihoods keep communities susceptible to coercion, promises of justice, or rent-seeking networks. Eg: Displacement around mineral corridors fuels long-term anger and instability.
• Ideological residue and urban support: Even with territorial losses, propaganda, recruitment narratives and digital influence can persist and re-organise. Eg: Online information warfare can revive legitimacy even when armed capability declines.

Way ahead

• Governance-led consolidation: After security gains, the state must win trust through justice delivery, primary health, schools and grievance redress, not only patrols. Eg: Fast-track courts and tribal health cadres can reduce everyday exploitation.
• Deepen local self-rule: Real devolution of funds/functions to Gram Sabhas makes democracy meaningful and blocks the space for parallel “people’s courts.” Eg: Adopt selective features of Sixth Schedule autonomy where contextually suitable.
• Administrative indigenisation: Recruiting locals into police, revenue and frontline services improves legitimacy, language access and cultural sensitivity in governance. Eg: Scaling the Bastariya Battalion model strengthens ownership of peace.
• Protect rights-based laws: Enforceable consent, CFR recognition and transparent land processes prevent fresh alienation and pre-empt insurgent narratives. Eg: Make Gram Sabha consent mandatory, time-bound, and auditable for projects.

Conclusion:

• India has decisively broken the territorial and military backbone of Naxalism through a calibrated mix of security, development and rehabilitation. The next phase demands governance reform, justice delivery and tribal empowerment to prevent relapse. A post-Maoist India will succeed only when constitutional promises translate into lived realities in Fifth Schedule areas.