US-China tensions can broadly be classified into four major areas: Trade, Technology, Territorial issues and Tenets, which allude to values, ideology and the advocacy of particular systems of political and economic governance (T4). In addition, there is growing rivalry across the Military domain (M).

South Asia

• The U.S. view of the smaller South Asian states (SSAs) has also changed as a result of U.S.-China competition. For one, this rivalry has put South Asia and the Indian Ocean region under a bigger spotlight U.S.-China Rivalry because this is seen as an important arena in which China is increasing its activities, presence, and influence. Indeed, the Chinese port project at Hambantota in Sri Lanka contributed to Washington’s seeing BRI from a more competitive prism.
• U.S. concerns about Chinese activities—concerns that converge with many of India’s—have also opened the door to a greater degree of U.S.-India consultation, coordination, and cooperation in the region. Delhi has historically not liked to see extra-regional countries be active in what it considers its backyard. But, just as in the 1950s and 1960s, as China has become more active in the region, India has become more accepting, if not welcoming, of more U.S. and Japanese involvement in the region if it brings additional resources and offers alternatives to China’s initiatives. This was evident in India’s response to the U.S.-Maldives defence agreement and the Japan-Maldives coast guard agreement. This attitude has also opened the door to potential U.S.- India cooperation (as they did in Nepal in the 1950s) or coordination (for example, on COVID-19 response) in the region.
• While the primary area of U.S.-China competition will remain in East Asia and the western Pacific, Beijing largely sees Washington—and particularly its ties with Delhi—as part of its challenge in South Asia. It   sees most U.S. actions there, alone and in conjunction with other major and middle powers, as complicating the landscape and Chinese interests. Some analysts have argued that Beijing, in response, should take a more moderate approach to Delhi lest China-India tensions push India toward the United States even further. Others, however, have asserted that Delhi is already allied and colluding with Washington, and that should not prevent a tougher approach to India—and indeed should serve as an argument for it.
• Publicly, Chinese analysts have often highlighted the U.S. presence in the region as a net negative. They have even suggested to Indian counterparts that the United States is a source or instigator of China-India problems.45 There have been some exceptions to the Chinese view of the United States as a problem in the region, and the two countries have even cooperated or consulted in response to crises. However, their intensifying rivalry could change that dynamic, too.

Southeast Asia

• The priorities of American strategy in Southeast Asia are security, politics and economic development while those of China are all focused on economic growth, in line with the needs of countries in the region.
• Most countries in the area count China as their largest trading partner. In 2021, trade between China and ASEAN reached $878.2 billion, about twice the value of trade between the U.S. and ASEAN. China has been the bloc''s largest trading partner since 2009, and in 2020 ASEAN surpassed the European Union to become China''s top trading partner.
• Over the years, China and ASEAN countries have expanded market access through various bilateral and multilateral trade pacts while engaging in deepening cooperation in e-commerce, digital economy and infrastructure development under the Belt and Road initiative. RCEP is expected to give the partnership a further boost.
• USA may leverage its regional coalition such as Quad -- with Australia, India and Japan -- to deepen its economic involvement and enhance security cooperation in the region.
• USA has sought to provide alternatives diplomatically, economically and militarily to what China has presented to Southeast Asian countries in order to counterbalance China’s influence. Clearly, the United States is highly sensitive to how well China is working with ASEAN nations. It is the logic of a zero-sum game – that China’s gains in Southeast Asia correspond with losses for the United States. While it may be true that China is attempting to diminish US regional influence and leverage its economic power to obtain support in the region, approaching the situation in win-lose terms has its own cost. Adopting a zero-sum approach means that US policymakers can lose sight of how policies are received by ASEAN nations, that countries in Southeast Asia do not consider US security concerns to be a central factor in the region and welcome China through the lens of economic opportunity. In this sense, the gains China has obtained in Southeast Asia are not seen to necessarily come at the cost of a decline in US influence.