Line of Actual Control (LAC)
- The disputed boundary between India and China, also known as the Line of Actual Control (LAC), is divided into three sectors: western, middle and eastern.
- Eastern Ladakh forms the western sector, to the east of the Karakoram and Ladakh Ranges. It runs from the Karakoram Pass in the north — 18 kilometres from the country’s highest airfield at Daulat Beg Oldie which is now connected by a road to Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie (DSDBO) road — to Chumur in the south, almost bordering Himachal Pradesh.
- Lake Pangong Tso lies closer to the centre of this 826 km long disputed border in eastern Ladakh.
- Issue: The LAC has never been demarcated. Differing perceptions are particularly acute in around two dozen spots across the Western (Ladakh), Middle (Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand), Sikkim, and Eastern (Arunachal Pradesh) sectors of the India-China border.
- The boundary in the Sikkim sector is broadly agreed, but has not been delineated.
- Aksai Chin & Arunachal Pradesh issue: Both nations claim these regions although China controls the former and India the latter.
- As it stands, China claims 90,000 sq km of Indian territory and occupies another 38,000 sqkm in Jammu and Kashmir.
- Besides, under the boundary agreement of March 1963, Pakistan illegally ceded 5,180 sq km of Indian territory in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir to China.
Significance of LAC: Both sides know a final settlement will ultimately have to use the LAC as a basis, with only minor adjustments.
Initiatives for resolution to the boundary issue: The annual Special Representative (SR) talks is the main channel and an important platform to discuss not only the solution to the boundary issue but also all other issues concerning the two countries.
- The two countries, according to the practice, hold the meetings in rotation
- Recently, the 22nd round of border talks were held between Mr. Ajit Doval, National Security Advisor and Chinese Foreign Minister Mr. Wang Yi.
Deadlock in the border talks
- India’s point: India doesn't want to negotiate one common line, but negotiate a line that Chinese don’t cross, and another line that India doesn't cross.
- Recently, India tried to persuade the Chinese leadership to restart discussions on the clarification of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) through the exchange of maps.
- China’s point: Clarifying perceptions of the LAC could help, but China has stalled the process as they are afraid the LAC will become the boundary.
- Instead, China asked for a comprehensive ‘code of conduct’ for the forces deployed along the border. This mismatch in desired outcomes was the main obstacle in the recent border talks.
- India’s objection: The Chinese proposal is aimed at limiting India’s military and infrastructure modernisation, and thereby enabling China to preserve its military advantage in Tibet.
Three urgent imperatives present:
- First, Indian Prime Minister must take the Opposition political parties into confidence on the nature of the crisis.
- Second, is the need for an early political consultation between Delhi and Beijing on exploring ways to end the stand-off.
- Restoring status quo ante: a renewed effort at resolving the conflict over the boundary dispute must necessarily complement the management of frequent crises on the Indian frontier with China.
- Two countries must begin the clarification of the Line of Actual Control on an urgent basis.
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There is always a temptation among analysts to link China’s border depredations against India to episodic elements in the bilateral relationship. While China has certainly used the ‘un-demarcated’ Line of Actual Control (LAC) as leverage against India in the past, the nature of the latest Chinese intrusions suggest that Zhongnanhai’s actions are driven by a historical tendency – that of expanding in the Himalayan borderlands at times of internal tumult. And despite the overall posturing, China is indeed grappling with internal economic and security problems exacerbated by the pandemic.
For India, this means that its traditional policy of pursuing confidence-building measures (CBMs) to dial down tensions will not work sustainably. Not one to look a gift horse in the mouth, China may even signal a temporary pause, only to keep striving to extend its claims wherever the People’s Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF) needs to and thinks it can, thereby making the LAC increasingly meaningless. India must read the tea leaves and realise that it will have to push back hard, however trying its own internal circumstances might be.
The nature of the Himalayan watershed dictates that any power to its north must seek to exert influence to its south (or west) and vice versa. Mao Zedong famously articulated this atavistic compulsion with his so-called ‘Five Fingers of Tibet’ formulation, wherein he saw Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Arunachal Pradesh as the five fingers of the right-hand palm that is Tibet. From the Chinese perspective, maintaining a steady hold over the Tibetan plateau ultimately requires being able to project power on the other side of Himalayan watershed, i.e. in the Five Fingers.
This stems from the historical geography of the Himalayan region, which allows the generation of bi-directional territorial claims between Tibet and the Five Fingers resulting in a bedrock of tension between the northern and the southern power that is ultimately tempered by a balance of military capability. This is the key reason why India and China have not been able to arrive at a boundary settlement and are unlikely to anytime soon.
Chinese empires in the past have sought to expand in the Himalayan region while in the throes of internal problems. This was the case with the Qing invasion of Tibet in 1910 that was followed by forays into what is today Eastern Arunachal Pradesh, right at the very death of the empire itself. This was also the case in the run up to the India-China war of 1962, which took place amidst Mao’s tragic ‘Great Leap Forward’.
It is almost as if China seeks to ‘settle’ its vulnerable western borderlands while it still can. Naturally, such a policy also conveys strength of purpose to both internal and international audiences, the latter being important in view of plummeting Sino-US ties. But it requires giving greater operational leeway to the executors of this policy, which in today’s context is the PLAGF.
General Studies