Introduction

Amid rising tensions between India and China in the Indo-Pacific, a subtler yet highly consequential contest is playing out in the Himalayan region. Beyond territorial disputes and military posturing, both countries are engaged in a strategic competition for religious and cultural influence over Himalayan Buddhism. What has historically been a tradition rooted in nonviolence and introspection is now deeply embedded in the machinery of geopolitical rivalry.

Buddhism as Instrument of Statecraft

China’s Strategy

Since the mid-20th century, the Chinese government has methodically integrated Tibetan Buddhism into its broader state apparatus. Independent religious authorities have been marginalized, monasteries placed under surveillance, and the reincarnation of Tibetan lamas made subject to official approval. In 2007, Beijing formalized its control by declaring that all “Living Buddhas” must receive state endorsement—an unprecedented political intervention in spiritual practice.

As part of its soft power strategy, China invests heavily in monastic infrastructure, maintains a database of approved lamas, and uses Buddhism to legitimize its territorial claims, particularly in disputed regions like Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh.

India’s Response

India’s engagement with Buddhist diplomacy has been more recent and reactive. Although the country has hosted the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-exile since 1959, it only began investing strategically in its Buddhist heritage over the past decade. Efforts to promote Buddhist pilgrimage circuits and cultural diplomacy are underway but remain fragmented and under-resourced compared to China’s coordinated initiatives. As scholars have observed, while India practices Buddhist diplomacy, China engages in full-fledged Buddhist statecraft.

The Dalai Lama Succession Crisis

The impending succession of the Dalai Lama presents a critical inflection point in this geopolitical contest. The current Dalai Lama, now 90, has indicated a desire to reincarnate outside of Chinese jurisdiction, most likely in India. In contrast, Beijing is preparing to appoint its own Dalai Lama through the historical Golden Urn method, ensuring control over the next spiritual leader.

This will likely lead to two rival Dalai Lamas—one recognized by the global Tibetan diaspora and another endorsed by the Chinese state. Such a division would not only fracture Tibetan Buddhism but also force regional Buddhist communities—in Ladakh, Arunachal Pradesh, Nepal, Bhutan, and beyond—to declare spiritual and, by extension, political allegiances.

Cultural Influence as Territorial Strategy

China’s use of Buddhist narratives extends beyond religious control to the assertion of territorial claims. In Arunachal Pradesh, China invokes historical and spiritual justifications to lay claim to Indian-administered regions. In Nepal, it has invested heavily in infrastructure around Lumbini, the Buddha’s birthplace, as part of a broader soft power campaign. In Bhutan, China subtly courts monastic authorities, challenging the kingdom’s traditional balance between modern diplomacy and religious heritage.

Soft Power as Hard Power in the Himalayas

In the context of the Himalayas, soft power—embodied in monasteries, religious authority, and cultural heritage—can function as a form of hard power. Shifts in monastic allegiance can influence regional stability and align border communities with one geopolitical actor over another. This dynamic is particularly salient in areas with sparse infrastructure and contested sovereignty.

Following the Dalai Lama’s death, the geopolitical ramifications of his succession will be felt far beyond India and China, extending to Buddhist-majority nations such as Mongolia, Thailand, and Sri Lanka.

Conclusion

The unfolding contest over Himalayan Buddhism reveals that contemporary geopolitics is not confined to military strategy or economic dominance. Instead, it increasingly encompasses spiritual and cultural realms. As India and China vie for regional influence, the control over religious narratives and institutions has become a central battleground. The future of the Indo-Himalayan region—and indeed, Asia—may depend as much on the politics of reincarnation and monastic loyalty as on conventional statecraft.